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The years preceding the Civil War were characterized by political turmoil at the national level,
suffusing politics in the most representative of national political institutions, the U.S. House of
Representatives.  An important feature of this political turmoil was the persistent difficulty of the
House in organizing itself for business.  In half of the twelve Congresses that convened from
1839 to 1861, the House had to endure multiple-ballot affairs for the choice of Speaker.  In at
least a couple of these multiple-ballot affairs, divisions were so deep and resolution seemed so
elusive that simply adjourning and waiting for the next election was a seriously-debated option.
One presumes that these organizational fights emerged because organizational control
over the House seemed like an important tool of legislative control.  This presumption has been
at the heart of virtually all the historical treatments of this era.  However, because of data and
theoretical limitations, this presumption has never been subject to systematic analysis.  Beginning
such a systematic analysis is the purpose of this paper.
Students of formal legislative institutions should be particularly drawn to the question of
whether the resolution of organizational conflict in the antebellum House influenced subsequent
legislative behavior.  This question is interesting for two distinct reasons.  First, one might be
interested in understanding what these organizational fights were really about.  Were they, in
fact, fights over how to organize the House that were intended to lock-in certain policy
trajectories, or were they orgiastic episodes of “position-taking,” with votes for Speaker
candidates serving as proxies for Representatives’ positions on the pressing issues of the day?
21I distinguish “partisan” from “nearly-partisan” organizations for the simple reason that a
couple of the organizing coalitions of this period were drawn from cross-party agreements,
particularly in the 26th Congress, when a small number of Calhounite Democrats joined with the
minority Whigs to elect a Whig speaker, and the 34th Congress, when Nathaniel Banks led a
multi-party coalition comprised of proto-Republicans and Americans.
Second, one might be interested in understanding how modern debates over the
consequences of formal legislative organization, particularly partisan organizations, are refracted
through the politics of an earlier party system.  Modern scholars are currently engaged in a
vigorous debate over whether partisan organizations, as such, have any substantive influence
over the legislative process, or whether they are simply a convenient re-labeling of the
substantive issues that divide voters and their representatives.  In this paper, I examine
antebellum speakership battles with this questions in mind, searching for evidence that the
resulting organizational coalitions had persistent policy effects beyond the narrow act of
organizing the House for business.
Therefore, the simple question this paper asks is this: Did the coalitions that came
together to elect Speakers of the House from 1839 to 1859 have persistent effects beyond the
moment of organization?  If they did, then there is evidence that even in a contentious, conflict-
ridden era of American politics, partisan (or nearly-partisan)1 legislative organization could
operate as an independent influence on policymaking, distinct from underlying preferences per
se.  If they did not, then this lends credence to the view that American political parties, at least in
general, label underlying cleavages, but have no independent pull on legislative behavior.
I pursue this topic by drawing on techniques used in recent scholarship that have
attempted to discern the independent influence on parties on congressional decisions.  In Section
II, I examine whether there is evidence of “legislative cartels” in House roll call voting from
32Histories of Speakership contests include Follett (1896), Galloway (1962), Leintz (1978)
Peters (1997), and Stewart (1999).
1839 to 1861, by studying the “win rates” of House members on floor votes.  In Section III, I
explore the influence that being a member of an organizing coalition had on the voting behavior
of its members, by examining changes in voting behavior from one Congress to the next as a
function of being in such coalitions.  Preceding these two analyses, it is necessary to review the
history of antebellum speakership contests.  That is the topic of Section I, to which I now turn.
I.  A Brief History of Speakership Elections, 1789–1861
Even though the speakership is arguably the second-most-powerful political leadership position
under the American Constitution, contests for it have been relatively subdued in the twentieth
century.2  Only once in the past century has it taken more than one ballot to pick a Speaker—in
1923 (68th Congress), when it took nine ballots over three days.  Both parties have now
developed routinized voting procedures to winnow down multiple pretenders whenever the
speakership comes open and more than two candidates emerge to seek a party’s nomination. 
More importantly, however, regardless of how contentious intra-party wrangling over the
speakership has been, once a party’s speakership nominee is chosen, the matter is settled.  The
story for the past century has been one of even disaffected “moderate” majority party members
(i.e., potentially pivotal from the perspective of the entire chamber) staying loyal to their party’s
candidate for Speaker, allowing the majority party to control the choice of Speaker and other
organizational issues fairly seamlessly.  As recent events have illustrated, when a member of a
congressional party grows disaffected with her party, she might change parties, but she won’t
actively support a renegade Speakership candidate on the floor of the House.
4Such smooth sailing in formally organizing the House is characteristic of House
speakership elections since 1865 (Stewart 1999).  From that point forward, the formal trappings
of speakership selection have been virtually unchanged: Both major parties have offered a single,
formal nominee to the House for consideration as Speaker, and then the majority party has
pushed through its nominee with virtual intraparty unanimity.  Even in 1923, when splits within
the Republican party led to progressive Republicans offering one of their own as a separate
Speaker candidate, throwing the speakership selection into multiple ballots, their dissent was
eventually accommodated by a “gentleman’s agreement” within the Republican party (Galloway
1962, pp. 47–48)
Moving back in time from 1865, however, one quickly encounters another world, full of
chaos, confusion, and political intrigue.  Table 1 summarizes speakership contests from the 1st to
the 57th Congress (1789–1901).  Before the Civil War, deadlock over the organization of the
U.S. House of Representatives was common.  Over one-third of all speakership contests from the
founding of the Republican until the outbreak of the Civil War (14 of 41) took more than one
ballot to resolve.  And at least two of the 27 single-ballot speakership elections during that time
were resolved in favor of a candidate whose party held a minority of House seats.
Basic summary statistics are a good first step in illustrating contention over organization
of the House in the antebellum period, but they are just a first step.  The multiple-ballot
speakership elections that occurred before the Civil War sprang up from many causes that are
associated with the political development of the nation, including the evolution of the House as a
political institution, the evolution of the speakership within it, and the evolution of the role of the
political parties as channels of mass (or even elite) political conflict.
53We do not know for certain how many ballots it took to elect the first two Speakers.
Based on what limited prior research there is on antebellum speakership battles (see
Leintz 1978), we can divide the nineteenth century into four periods, based on the strength of
party identification among House members, strength of organizational party discipline, and the
value of the speakership as a political prize.  The periods are summarized in Table 2, and I
discuss them briefly here.
The first period lasted through the eleventh Congress, from 1789 to 1811.  This period
was characterized by loose party identification among the rank-and-file, a weak partisan role
played by the Speaker, and a sense within the House that the Speaker was a minor prize.  At least
four Speaker elections during this period were multi-ballot affairs,3 reflecting the weakness of
legislative party organizations and haphazard politicking for control of the House.  None of the
multi-ballot affairs was protracted, however.  The repercussions of organizational jockeying
tended to be minor, with the notable exception of Theodore Sedgwick’s (Fed.-Mass.) election in
the Sixth Congress (1799–1801), whose behavior as Speaker only heightened the severe
divisions that already existed between Republicans and Federalists (see Follett 1896, pp. 87–88).
The second period was ushered in by Henry Clay in the Twelfth Congress (1811–13) and
lasted until roughly the 26th Congress (1839–41).  It, too, was a period more characterized by
factionalism than by party loyalty.  But, unlike the first period, Clay’s speakership demonstrated
the strategic value of the speakership, and thus contests for the office became more heated.
Encompassing most of the “Era of Good Feeling,” speakership fights during the second period
were not structured along partisan lines, but rather along personality-based or regional factions.
Somehow, Clay was able to hold these centrifugal forces at bay, but efforts to replace him during
6his two hiatuses illustrate just how fractured the power distribution within the House was during
this period (cf. Young 1966, Stewart 1998, Strahan, et al. 1998, Jenkins and Stewart 1999,
Strahan 1999).  What stability could be found in organizing the House in this period rested
largely in the person of Henry Clay himself.
A similar story can be told about an equally-dominating, but less well-known Speaker
from the same era, Andrew Stevenson (Jack.-Va.).  Stevenson was an ardent supporter of
Andrew Jackson, and thus was clearly aligned with the emergent Democratic party that
eventually controlled the federal government.  He was elected Speaker four consecutive
Congresses—the first time by a hair’s breadth, but the other times by comfortable margins.  But,
after Stevenson resigned in the middle of the 23rd Congress (1834) to accept Jackson’s
appointment as ambassador to England, the House was thrust into a succession crisis.  The
majority Jacksonians could not settle on a single candidate, resulting in a first ballot in which six
Jacksonians received more than ten votes, including four (Richard H. Wilde [Ga.], James K. Polk
[Tenn.], Joel Sutherland [Penn.], and John Bell [Tenn.]) who received more than thirty.  After ten
ballots Bell was elected Speaker, most likely on the votes of many Whigs.  Lacking a public vote
for Speaker, both Whigs and Jacksonians claimed victory.
Another Whig-Democratic coalition emerged in the 11-ballot affair that ended this era in
the 26th Congress (1839–41).  Factionalism among both the Democrats and Whigs was rampant,
which led to a number of aborted efforts by leaders of both parties to build a majority. Robert
M.T. Hunter (Whig-Va.) was eventually elected Speaker, receiving votes from seven South
Carolina Democrats, which sent him over the top.
7Hunter’s cross-party coalition marked the end of an era.  The sorting of national politics
in the late 1830s along Whig-Democratic lines ushered-in a third period in the organizational
politics of the House.  Party became a more direct organizing device, though its effectiveness
was limited.  The principle of party loyalty in organizational matters that emerged in this period
simply meant that House members (almost) never voted to support a Speaker candidate from the
opposite party.  It did not mean that party members automatically supported a single party
candidate of their own—assuming one existed.  At the same time, though, because both parties
were delicately-constructed national organizations, regional issues often interfered with the
ability of the majority party to rally behind a single Speaker candidate. 
This third period, which lasted from roughly the 27th Congress (1841–43) to the 36th
(1859–61), witnessed the most protracted and bitter fights over the organization of the House in
its history.  While this bitterness was heightened in the wake of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, it only
irritated a nerve that was already raw.  The refusal of small factions of both parties to support
their parties’ candidates, combined with an even stronger aversion to crossing party lines to
effect an organization, led to the election of Speakers via a plurality rule twice in this period—in
the 31st and 34th Congresses (1849 and 1855)—and led to the proposal of the plurality rule even
more often than that.
The fourth period lies beyond the coverage of this paper.  The Civil War, and the
Republican hegemony that accompanied it in the House, saw a rapid consolidation of the
majority party’s control over its organization.  The new era was ushered in at the start of the 37th
Congress (1861) when the majority Republicans split their votes between two speakership
candidates on the first ballot—between Galusha A. Grow (Penn., 71 votes) and Francis P. Blair
84The vote switching also contained a couple of puzzling details that must await future
research.  In particular, just as 27 erstwhile supporters of Blair switched to Grow, along with the
one representative who had supported Stevens, two members abandoned Grow, one to vote for
Wright,  other for Corning.
5Of course, this is not to say that petty factionalism or small third parties did not make
their appearance in the future, only that these occurrences were trivial with respect to organizing
the House.
(Mo., 40 votes)—in addition to scattering individual votes among half a dozen other candidates. 
Unlike past Congresses, when such an occurrence might set off a protracted struggle between the
various majority party factions for control of the House, the next step was truly amazing:  One
after another, supporters of Blair were recognized and changed their votes to Grow.4  Grow’s
tally now stood at 99 out of the 159 cast, and he was elected Speaker.  In an instant, the
simultaneous fight for control of the Republican party and of the House was over, not to erupt
again on the floor at its convening for the next sixty years.  From that time to the present, with
only a couple of notable exceptions, control of the House has been effectively settled within the
majority party prior to the House’s convening.5
Although multiple-ballot contention over the speakership has been commented on in
various histories of the House, and has certainly been a subject covered in various monographs
about the speakership, systematic analysis of speakership contests has been scant.  With the
notable recent exception of Jenkins and Nokken (2000), very little research has addressed
individual-level behavior in these episodes.  The primary reason behind this deficiency in the
literature is obvious: Until 1837 (25th Congress), voting for Speaker was done via secret ballot. 
96There is no research, of which I am aware, that treats this important rules change
directly.  The change to viva voce balloting elicited the most anxiety from northern Whigs, as the
following cross-tabulation of support for the rules change shows.  (Percentages are the fraction of
the category who supported the rules change. The numbers in parentheses are the n’s.)
Party
Slave state Whig Dem.
Anti-
Mason Nullifier Ind. Total
No 12%
(53)
93%
(69)
0%
(6)
— — 55%
(128)
Yes 47%
(43)
100%
(32)
— 67%
(3)
100%
(1)
68%
(79)
Total 27%
(96)
95%
(101)
0%
(6)
67%
(3)
100%
(1)
60%
(207)
7Jenkins and Nokken (2000) is one model of how such individual-level data can be
marshalled—in this case, analyzing the organizational implications of electing American Party
member Nathaniel Banks Speaker in 1856.
Following a rules change at the end of the 25th Congress, voting began to be viva voce, effective
with the balloting for Speaker in the 26th Congress, in 1839.6  
This paper is part of a larger project, in which I have been gathering the individual-level
data associated with voting in the speakership contests.  With such data, we will be in a position
to address empirical issues that have hung over histories of many of the contentious speakership
battles, particularly issues that pertain to the nature of the coalitions that came together to choose
the Speakers of this period, and questions that pertain to the individual-level legislative behavior
that may have flowed from organizing particular Houses.7
For the rest of this paper, I confine my analysis to the antebellum period for which we
have individual-level data about who House members supported for Speaker on each ballot,
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1839–1859 (26th–36th Congress).  As suggested above, this period is fairly self-contained with
respect to historical dynamics, particularly with respect to the volatility of choosing Speakers. 
This fact makes this period unusual, for the reasons already stated.  It is, however, one of the rare
cases in American history when organizing Congress hinged on the coalition-building abilities of
its leaders at the outset, and therefore offers unusual opportunities for studying coalition-building
in the American context—what comparativists might call government formation in other
contexts.
II.  Legislative Cartels in the House, 1839–1859
In recent years congressional scholars have hotly debated whether political parties can, for very
long, control legislative machinery to ensure that policymaking favors the mainstream of the
majority party, at the expense of the mainstream of the whole chamber.  For the sake of
simplicity, we can pose this debate in terms of a “legislative cartel” model, associated with the
work of McCubbins and collaborators (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Cox and McCubbins
1993), versus a “pivotal politics” model, associated with the work of Keith Krehbiel (1998).
A “legislative cartel” can be defined as the capturing of internal legislative institutions by
a majority—usually the majority party—for the purpose of enacting policy more to the liking of
that majority, as distinct from, say, a more centrist majority which might emerge in a legislature
dominated by the dynamics of pure majority rule in one dimension.  A legislative cartel might
operate through many mechanisms, including committee composition and floor recognition rules. 
Here, I focus on recognition rules, since it has direct implications for patterns in roll call
behavior, which I later examine.
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One way in which the majority party might use the rules to encourage policy to march
toward the majority party median is illustrated through the following spatial example.  Begin
with the standard unidimensional spatial model that operates under pure majority rule.  Suppose
the ideal points of a legislature are arrayed uniformly in a unidimensional space, as illustrated in
Figure 1.  This legislature considers ten roll call votes, with “cut lines” located as indicated in the
figure.  In roll call vote number 1, with cut line number 1, the rightward alternative prevails,
since that is the side of the space that includes the chamber median.  Thus everyone to the left of
the cut line is on the losing side of the roll call and everyone to the right is on the winning side. 
The Ls and the Ws in the figure indicate whether members of the separate ideological regions win
or lose that roll call.
After all ten roll calls are taken, all the legislators who lie between the fifth and sixth cut
lines—which includes the median—have been on the prevailing side on each roll call vote. 
Members lying further away from this region prevail less often, in direct proportion to the
distance from the region that includes the median.
Now, consider a world that is organized by a legislative cartel that operates as follows. 
First, for simplicity, assume that all members of the minority party lie to the left of all members
of the majority party, as illustrated in Figure 2.  Second, assume that the majority party controls
the agenda-setting mechanisms of the legislature, such that no votes are allowed on propositions
that would result in the median of the majority party (indicated by J in the figure) being on the
losing side. In such a world, any roll call vote involving cut lines 6 and 7 would be ruled out of
the agenda, since J would lose the vote.  As a consequence of this agenda-control device, all
members who lie in the regions between the one occupied by the chamber median and the one
12
8See Lawrence, Maltzman, and Smith (1999) for an examination of a similar model, using
a more modern set of roll call votes.  Also see Cox and McCubbins (1999)
9In coining the phrase organizing coalition, I remain agnostic for the moment about
whether the coalition was anything more than simply an empirical phenomenon.  Indeed, the
point of the paper is to explore whether these coalitions were anything more than an
epiphenomenon of the beginning-of-Congress Speakership balloting.
occupied by the majority party median prevail in all observed roll calls. Empirically, the
ideological region of the “most frequent winners” of roll call votes has expanded, shifting toward
the majority party median.
The frequency of being on the winning side of observed roll call votes under these two
regimes—pure majority rule versus agenda-controlling legislative cartel—as a function of
ideological location is summarized by the graph in Figure 3.  This graph illustrates again an
important implication that is likely to be associated with a party-based legislative cartel
controlling the agenda:  Majority party members win more often than they would under pure
majority rule; the members who benefit the most lie in the region between the floor median and
the majority party median.8
In applying this insight to roll call voting in the antebellum House, we need to make one
important modification.  Because parties did not uniformly unite behind a single candidate for
Speaker, it is probably best to explore it with respect to the coalition that supported the victorious
speakership candidate on the final ballot—what I have been calling the organizing coalition.9
If agenda-setting operates in a manner consistent with this example, then we should
discover that the most frequent winner of roll call votes is not the median of the House, but has
rather been shifted toward the median of the organizing coalition.  Figure 4 graphs the percentage
of times from the 26th to 36th Congresses that each House member was on the prevailing side of
13
10The Heckman-Snyder technique produces roll call scales based on linear factor analysis. 
Like Poole and Rosenthal’s (1997) NOMINATE technologies, the Heckman-Snyder technique is
built on an assumption that members of Congress act based on a spatial model of
decisionmaking.  Linear factor scales are highly correlated with NOMINATE scores.  For the
26th to 36th Congress, the correlation in scores between the two techniques averages .9864 on
the first dimension, ranging from .9916 (35th Congress) to .9783 (33rd Congress).  The
correlation between the two techniques on higher dimensions is smaller, however, undoubtedly
due to the different functional forms the two techniques use to estimate ideal points.
roll call votes against a measure of his “ideology,” measured by a linear factor technique
described by Heckman and Snyder (1997).10  Also indicated are the location of the floor median
and the median of the organizing coalition.  A second-degree polynomial has been fit through the
data in each graph, using least squares regression, to help in identifying where the most frequent
roll call winners are located in each Congress.
Visual examination of Figure 4 suggests a mixed bag with respect to the legislative cartel
idea as applied to the antebellum House.  It was rarely the case that the floor median was (close
to) the most frequent winner of floor votes in this period.  However, there is mixed evidence
about whether the organizing coalition could reasonably be termed a legislative cartel that
controlled legislative outcomes on the floor.  In at least four instances (26th, 31st, 32nd, and 35th
Congresses), more frequent legislative victories came in the direction of the ideological space of
House members who had opposed the Speaker’s election.  In only six cases (the 27th, 29th, 30th,
33rd, 34th, and 36th Congresses), does it appear that roll call success was shaded in the direction
toward the organizing coalition.
We can test this visual impression more precisely by running the regressions that are
implied by the graphs in Figure 4.  In this case, the dependent variable is the percentage of roll
call votes in which member i was on the prevailing side of all roll call votes in Congress c.  The
14
11By construction, first and second dimension scores are uncorrelated with each other. 
However, the second dimension scores often provide a significant improvement in overall fit,
which assists in improving the overall efficiency of the estimation.
independent variables are “ideological location,” as measured by the first two dimensions derived
using the Heckman-Snyder linear factor scaling technique.  The second dimension is included to
improve the efficiency of the estimates, but does not change the first dimension coefficients
materially.11
Because I want to test whether the maximum of the winning percentage in each Congress
is located at the median (in both directions), I need to include the squared terms of the two
ideology measures.  Furthermore, because I want to test whether the maximum of the estimated
winning percentage is at the median of the House in a particular Congress, I need to transform
the ideology measures by subtracting them from their respective medians.  Therefore, the
regressions I perform can be written as follows:
Wi,c = 0  + 1(h1,i,c-m1,c) + 2(h1,i,c-m1,c)2 + 3(h2,i,c-m2,c) + 4(h2,i,c-m2,c)2 + i,c
where Wi,c = the percentage of time that member i was on the winning side of roll call votes in
Congress c; h1,i,c and h2,i,c are the first two dimensions of the linear factor scores for member i in
Congress c; and m1,c and m2,c are the respective chamber-wide medians of the linear factor
measures for Congress c.  With this set-up, we can test the null hypothesis that the chamber
median is the most frequent winner in a Congress by testing statistically whether 1 = 3 = 0.
Table 3 reports the results of these regressions.  In general, the results confirm the visual
analysis:  With the exception of the 28th Congress, we can confidently reject the idea that the
median (along the first Heckman-Snyder dimension) was the most frequent winner of roll call
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votes.  However, in the ten Congresses where we can reject this hypothesis, the sign of the
coefficient is in the proper direction six times, and in the wrong direction four times.
Three of these four cases in which the sign of the coalition coefficient is in the wrong
direction are associated with Congresses in which either the Speaker was elected via a plurality
or the Speaker was elected by a coalition that was dominated by the minority party.  Thus, for
instance, in the 26th Congress (1839–41), the Whig Robert M.T. Hunter was elected Speaker
with the help of a small band of defecting Democrats.  Yet even though a Whig wielded the gavel
in this Congress, having been supported by a coalition that was dominated by other Whigs,
Democrats still held a nominal majority in the chamber, and they apparently used their numerical
majority to their advantage.  
How they pulled off such a feat is a puzzle which must await further research. 
Contemporary Whigs complained that Hunter’s committee assignments looked as if they had
been made in the President’s cabinet—a cabinet presided over by the Democrat Martin Van
Buren (See Leintz 1978, p. 77).  My own preliminary analysis of Hunter’s committee
assignments confirms much of this charge.  Thus, the tendency of the “left” side of the
ideological spectrum to dominate roll call voting in the 26th Congress, even though the “right”
side of the spectrum had formed the coalition that elected the Speaker may be due to the agenda-
setting power of committees.  Of course, this begs the question of why Hunter abandoned the
coalition that elected him Speaker when he made up committee assignments.
This preliminary analysis of the possibility of legislative cartels in the antebellum House
suggests the usefulness of further research on this matter, which would combine quantitative
analysis of how cartels might have operated (such as through committee assignments) with a
16
qualitative analysis of the historical record.  It is clear that the median member did not generally
dominate floor deliberations in the antebellum House.  It is also clear that nothing guaranteed
that members of the organizing coalition would go on to be the dominant legislative force for the
remainder of the Congress.  Resolving this puzzle will be the goal of future research.
III.  Voting Patterns and Organizing Coalitions
Another observable implication of the enduring effects of organizing coalitions concerns the roll
call behavior of coalition members viewed another way than in the previous section.  The
thinking here is very similar to that proposed by scholars who suggest that legislative parties
exert some sort of influence (or perhaps even “pressure”) over their members, independent of
party members’ preferences (see Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart, 2000; Snyder and
Groseclose 2000).  Within the current party debate, the independent influence of political parties
is most directly tested by regressing a measure of roll call behavior on a measure of preferences
and a dummy variable indicating one’s nominal party membership.  Measures of roll call
behavior are easy to come by, and typically include measures such as Poole and Rosenthal’s D-
NOMINATE scores or Heckman and Snyder’s linear factor scores.  Measures of preferences that
are uncontaminated by roll call behavior are harder to come by, but have included scales
developed using answers to questionnaires administered to incumbents (Ansolabehere, Snyder,
and Stewart, 2000; Burden and Kenny 2000) and scales using subsets of roll call votes (see
Snyder and Groseclose 2000).
We can address a question that is similar to that invovled in the current party debate, by
asking whether the coalitions that emerged to elect Speakers in the antebellum House had a
17
12For a general critique of using roll call votes to learn about party voting, see Krehbiel
2000.
similar influence on roll call behavior, once preferences had been controlled-for.  Unfortunately,
for current purposes I cannot rely on a clean measure of preferences for House members that is
uncontaminated by the legislative situation I am intent upon studying.  Therefore, for the current
research I am stuck relying on roll call votes to measure preferences.12
To understand the technique I will use in this section, consider a situation in which we
can measure the roll call voting behavior of a legislator on the same scale in two succeeding
Congresses.  The scale indicates the member’s true preferences, plus or minus an error that is
peculiar to that Congress.  Therefore the scale score in Congress t for member i can be written,
Si,t = pi + eit
where  pi = the preferences of member i, measured on the scale, and eit = the random error
particular to member i in Congress t, which has a mean of zero.
Now, suppose that all members of the organizing coalition agree to actions that move
their scale scores systematically in one direction, by a uniform amount.  If this “coalitional
pressure” is written ct, then
Si,t = pi + eit + ct
if the member is in the coalition.  If the member is in the coalition in Congress 1 and not in the
coalition in Congress 2 (c2 = 0), and if values of  eit are not serially correlated, then the average
difference in the scale scores between the two Congresses will simply be the value of the
coalition pressure coefficient: Si,2  – Si,1 =  ct.  Therefore, if we had legislator roll call behavior
measured on the same scale across two Congresses, then the amount of “pressure” exerted by the
18
13Needless to say, we could not measure the degree of coalition pressure by observing
only members who had either been in the organizing coalitions of both Congresses or had been
outside the coalitions in both Congresses.  These members are still important controls, and need
to be included in the analysis, since they help to identify systematic changes in voting patterns
across the two Congresses that may be independent of coalition membership.
14The Poole-Rosenthal DW-NOMINATE scores are common-space estimates, but they
are also dynamic, in the sense that they allow members to move systematically across time.  It is,
of course, possible to produce common-space estimates of ideological positions by pooling
together numerous Congresses, under an assumption that the underlying preferences of members
of Congress do not change.  I have not pursued that avenue here, precisely because I want to
analyze Congress-to-Congress changes in roll call patterns, and at least hold open the possibility
that roll call patterns are mutable on such a short time horizon.
Ci,2 =



1 if member is in coalition at time 2 and not at time 1
-1 if member is in coalition at time 1 and not at time 2
0 otherwise
organizing coalition would simply be the average difference in the scale scores among members
who had been in the coalition one Congress, but not in the other.13
For the analysis below, we do not have a simple common-space measure of roll call
behavior for the time period of the 26th to 36th Congresses.14  However, we do have individual,
Congress-by-Congress measures of roll call voting behavior.  If we assume that the difference in
scales from one Congress to the next is simply due to a linear transformation of the scale, then
we could test for the effects of being in the organizing coalition with the following regression:
Si,2 = 0 + 1Si,1 + 2Ci,2 + i,2
where
The test of coalition pressure would then come down to a statistical test of whether 2 = 0.
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However, we also may encounter a situation in which the mapping of the scale from one
Congress to another is not through a simple linear transformation in one dimension.  In
particular, if the space is “rotating,” as would happen during a realigning era, then the test would
be badly mis-specified if we simply included the lagged value of the first dimension scale score
in the regression.  During the time in question, this is a salient problem, since almost all scholars
agree that American politics underwent precisely such a realignment in the middle of the 1850s,
such that what had been a second dimension of politics—regional issues, especially
slavery—became the primary cleavage.
Therefore, to account for possible rotations in the issue space, I controlled for higher
dimensions—six, to be precise—in testing for coalition influence below.  Finally, to allow for the
possibility that the mapping from one Congress to the other might not be strictly linear, I
included the squares of all the roll call terms in the regression.  Therefore, the regressions I ran
can be written as follows:
The scale scores (Si,2,1 and the various Si,1,d terms) are linear factor scores derived using the linear
technique justified by Heckman and Snyder (1997).  The variable Ci,2 = 1 if the member voted for
the winning Speaker candidate in the current Congress, 0 otherwise; Ci,1 = 1 if the member voted
for the winning Speaker candidate in the previous Congress, 0 otherwise.
In Table 4, I have reported the coefficients associated with the coalition membership
variables ( 1 and 2), suppressing the coefficients associated with the lagged values of the scale
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15In all Congresses, the strongest predictor of the first-dimension linear factor score was
the first-dimension linear factor score from the previous Congress.  The only Congresses for
which the coefficient on the lagged value of the first-dimension linear factor score was less than
0.7 were the 28th , 31st, and 34th Congresses.  In the 28th Congress, which experienced a
tremendous amount of electoral turnover, the space had rotated in such a way that the third
dimension of voting from the 27th Congress was the strongest predictor of first dimension voting
in the 28th.  Second dimension scores in the 30th Congress had a strong effect on first dimension
scores in the 3st Congress—an effect rivaling that of the first dimension.  And in the 34th
Congress, 4th, 5th, and 6th dimension scores from the 33rd Congress had a strong effect on
predicting first dimension scale scores.  (Jenkins and Nokken [2000] argue that the issue space is
stable during this period, although results like this suggest otherwise.)
All of this is evidence that the political space was evolving during this period, and should
caution us against proceeding too quickly to our conclusions.  However, recall that the purpose of
including these higher dimensions in the prediction is precisely to get the issue space mapping
right, from one Congress to the next.
scores.15  (As the overall R2s indicate, almost all of the variation in scale scores is explained in
terms of lagged values of those scores.)  The coefficients that interest us most are in the first two
columns labeled “this Congress” and “last Congress.”  In general, if coalitions perturbed member
voting patterns, then the signs of the coefficients under the first “this Congress” column should
correspond with the ideological direction of the organizing coalition.  That is, if the organizing
coalition resided to the left of the space, then its members should be moved an extra increment to
the left.  This is generally what we find, although the effects are statistically significant in only
four Congresses—the 27th, 30th, 34th, and 36th.  Interestingly enough, three of these four
Congresses—the 30th, 34th, and 36th—were associated with multi-ballot speakership fights. 
Each of these cases also coincided with the speakership changing partisan hands.
The effect of being in the organizing coalition is particularly striking in the 34th
Congress, which is notable for two reasons.  First, it is the only Congress in American history
when a member of a “third party” was elected Speaker.  Second, as argued by Jenkins and
Nokken (2000), the coalition that emerged to elect Banks represented the first organizational
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victory for the new Republican Party.  Here, we can add to Jenkins and Nokken’s evidence that
this was an organizational victory for the nascent party by noting that supporting Banks for
Speaker had an appreciable effect on the subsequent roll call behavior of his supporting
coalition’s members.
In Figure 5 I illustrate how the behavior of the Banks coalition members in the 34th
Congress differed from the coalition of members who supported Linn Boyd (D-Ga.) in the 33rd
Congress.  In Figure 5a, I have plotted the 1st dimension linear factor scores for the 33rd
Congress against those of the 32nd Congress.  The curve in the figure is the second-degree
polynomial fit of the data.  Data points labeled with “1"s are members who voted for Boyd at the
organization of the 33rd Congress; “0"s are those who voted against Boyd.  Even though a fair
number of Boyd supporters shifted to the “left” of the issue space, compared to where they were
in the 32nd Congress, a non-trivial number actually shifted to the right.  These members were
primarily Pennsylvania and New York Democrats who had grown disaffected with the southern
wing of the party.  On the other hand, although most of the anti-Boyd (mostly Whig) contingent
moved rightward between the two Congresses, a small number of border-state Whigs drifted
toward the left. 
Not so in the 34th Congress.  Note here that the “moderate” members of both the pro- and
anti-Banks coalitions (i.e., the members closer to the center of the overall issue space) moved
away from each other between Congresses.  The members who particularly define the
relationship that is reported in Table 4 are the “rightist” anti-Banks members and the “leftist”
pro-Banks members.  In the 34th Congress, House members such as Emerson Etheridge (Tenn.),
who had been good Whigs, and thus in opposition to the coalition that had been assembled by
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16The nominal party codings are taken from Martis (1989).
Boyd, were repelled by the coalition assembled by Banks.  At the other extreme, members like
Matthias Nichols (Whig, Ohio) and Galusha Grow (Penn., former Free Soil Democrat), who had
often voted with the Democrats in the 33rd Congress, were shoved in the direction of Banks and
his coalition of new Republicans.
In the analysis reported in the first few columns of Table 4, I did not control for nominal
party membership, allowing all “partisan” effects to act through the organizing coalitions. 
However, almost all of the organizing coalitions that did emerge were primarily partisan affairs. 
With the exception of the 26th and 34th Congresses, virtually no members of the “wrong” party
crossed over and supported the victorious Speaker candidate.  However, in almost all of these
Congresses, some members of the “majority party” refused to vote for the victorious Speaker. 
This suggests that we should, at the very least, test for organizing coalition effects after
controlling for nominal party membership.
Therefore, the middle columns of Table 4 report the coefficients associated with being in
a winning coalition, after entering in a series of dummy variables to account for all parties that
had members in each Congress.16  In the 28th Congress party loyalty was sufficiently high among
both Whigs and Democrats that we cannot estimate independently the effect of being in the
coalition that elected Jones and being a Democrat or Whig.  In all other Congresses, however,
adding controls for party actually improves the estimates we get for being in the organizing
coalition.  In all of the Congresses where the coalition coefficient had previously been
significant, either the coefficient grew once we controlled for party or the standard error shrank. 
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This is strong evidence that the effect that being in the organizing coalition had on roll call
behavior was something other than simple partisanship.
The analysis offered in this section is preliminary, but suggestive.  In some Congresses in
the antebellum House, being in the organizing coalition appears to have affected subsequent roll
call behavior.  This is especially significant in the case of the 34th Congress, where independent
research has suggested that the coalition that elected the Speaker formed the first organizational
manifestation in the federal government of a new party.
IV.  Conclusions
Modern students of the American Congress are currently in the midst of a debate about the
degree to which Congress is empirically majoritarian.  It is formally majoritarian, at least as
described in the Constitution.  Is it actually majoritarian?  The resolution to this debate is
important, both for purely theoretical reasons and for our understanding of how American
politics actually works.
Regardless of how this debate is resolved, its resolution will be of limited utility if the
field of battle is confined to the modern, post-war (or even post-Reagan) era.  If the power of the
debate derives from our desire to understand something enduring about American political
institutions, then we certainly need to know something about the majoritarian nature of Congress
well before the field of political science emerged in the late nineteenth century.  
Viewed another way, students of American history are also interested in understanding
how America’s political institutions have functioned during crises.  In the antebellum period, did
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Congress operate to cool national passions, or to inflame them?  How does the answer to this
question help us to understand Congress in other periods of inflammatory politics?
This paper provides some preliminary answers to these questions, although clearly more
research needs to be done.  At least some of the time, the House was not a majoritarian institution
in the twenty years leading up to the Civil War.  In most years, policymaking was dominated by a
relatively extreme wing of the chamber.  What is particularly troubling (or at least intriguing) is
that policy was not always dominated by the wing of the chamber that had prevailed in its
organization.  Why, and how, this might occur is an important topic for future research.
There are other topics of future research that flow from this paper.  Most obviously, all of
the analyses in Sections II and III are preliminary, and await the application of more precise (and
time-consuming) methods.  For instance, the “win rate” analysis of Section II treats all roll calls
equally, even though we need to make finer distinctions among the roll calls, such as between
amendments, final passage, and procedural votes.  Section III awaits an application of another
technique, such as the one recently described by Snyder and Groseclose (2000), to get a better
measure of actual legislative preferences that are uncontaminated by legislative action, so that we
can be more certain of our estimates of the effects of joining in on the winning coalition.  And, of
course, very little of this paper has addressed directly the substance of the policies over which
House members fought during this period.
Addressing all of these shortcomings, and more, will be the future of future research.  As
those findings come more sharply into focus, the independent role of legislative institutions in
guiding the trajectory of policymaking will also become more sharply defined.
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Figure 1.  Winning and losing roll call votes under majority rule.
Figure 2.  Winning and losing roll call votes under a legislative cartel that controls the agenda.
Le
ft o
f 1
B/t
 1 
& 2
B/t
 2 
& 3
B/t
 3 
& 4
B/t
 
4 &
 
5
B/t
 5 
& 6
B/t
 
6 &
 
7
B/t
 
7 &
 
8
B/t
 
8 &
 
9
B/t
 
9 &
 10
Rig
ht 
of 
10
location
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
W
in
n
in
g 
pc
t.
M J
Pure majority rule
Legislative cartel
Figure 3. Frequency of being on the prevailing side of a roll call, as a function of ideological
location and decisionmaking agenda.
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Figure 4.  Winning percentage as a function of ideology.
F = floor median; C = median of coalition that supported winning Speaker candidate
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Figure 5. Movement in roll call scale scores across two Congresses, 32nd%33rd and 33rd%34th.
a.  33rd Congress versus 32nd Congress.
b.  34th Congress versus 33rd Congress
Table 1.  Summary Speakership votes, 1st–57th Congress (1789–1901)
Effective number of candidates Winning Speaker candidate Majority party
Year Cong sess. Ballots First ballot Last ballot Winning pct. Name Party Name Pct.
1789 1 1 Unknown Unknown Unknown Muhlenberg Pro-Admin. Pro-Admin. 56.9
1791 2 1 Unknown Unknown Unknown Trumbull Pro-Admin. Pro-Admin. 56.5
1793 3 1 3 2.87 1.95 57.8% Muhlenberg Anti-Admin. Anti-Admin. 51.4
1795 4 1 1 1.93 59.7% Dayton Federalist Republican 55.7
1797 5 1 1 1.05 97.5% Dayton Federalist Federalist 53.8
1799 6 1 2 2.71 2.18 51.2% Sedgwick Federalist Federalist 56.6
1801 7 1 1 1.79 67.1% Macon Republican Republican 63.6
1803 8 1 1 Unknown Macon Republican Republican 72.5
1805 9 1 3 3.02 2.66 54.7% Macon Republican Republican 80.3
1807 10 1 1 2.00 50.4% Varnum Republican Republican 81.7
1809 11 1 2 2.71 2.21 55.1% Varnum Republican Republican 64.8
1811 12 1 1 1.74 69.4% Clay Republican Republican 74.8
1813 13 1 1 2.02 60.1% Clay Republican Republican 62.6
1814 13 2 1 2.33 54.7% Cheves Republican
1815 14 1 1 1.69 71.3% Clay Republican Republican 65.0
1817 15 1 1 1.08 96.0% Clay Republican Republican 78.9
1819 16 1 1 1.11 94.8% Clay Republican Republican 86.0
1820 16 2 22 4.38 2.59 51.4% Taylor Republican
1821 17 1 12 3.76 2.40 51.2% Barbour Republican Republican 61.5
1823 18 1 1 1.55 76.8% Clay A-C Rep. A-C Rep. + 40.8
1825 19 1 2 3.34 2.75 51.3% Taylor Adams Adams 51.2
1827 20 1 1 2.00 50.7% Stevenson Jackson Jackson 53.1
1829 21 1 1 1.48 79.6% Stevenson Jackson Jackson 63.8
1831 22 1 1 1.85 64.5% Stevenson Jackson Jackson 59.2
1833 23 1 1 1.82 65.7% Stevenson Jackson Jackson 59.6
1834 23 2 10 5.60 2.34 53.8% Bell Jackson
1835 24 1 1 1.94 58.7% Polk Jackson Jackson 59.1
1837 25 1 1 2.00 51.8% Polk Democrat Democrat 52.9
1839 26 1 11 2.37 2.99 51.3% Hunter Whig Democrat 51.7
1841 27 1 1 2.24 54.8% White Whig Whig 58.7
1843 28 1 1 1.78 68.1% Jones Democrat Democrat 65.9
1845 29 1 1 2.26 57.1% Davis Democrat Democrat 62.3
1847 30 1 3 3.01 2.87 50.5% Winthrop Whig Whig 50.4
1849 31 1 63 2.45 2.45 45.5% Cobb Democrat Democrat 48.5
1851 32 1 1 2.94 55.9% Boyd Democrat Democrat 54.5
1853 33 1 1 2.16 65.7% Boyd Democrat Democrat 67.1
1855 34 1 133 5.10 2.22 48.1% Banks American Opposition 42.7
1857 35 1 1 2.16 56.9% Orr Democrat Democrat 55.7
1859 36 1 44 3.79 2.56 50.2% Pennington Republican Republican 48.7
1861 37 1 2 3.63 2.46 62.3% Grow Republican Republican 59.0
1863 38 1 1 2.69 55.5% Colfax Republican Republican 46.2
1865 39 1 1 1.49 79.4% Colfax Republican Republican 70.5
1867 40 1 1 1.45 80.9% Colfax Republican Republican 76.5
1869 41 1 1 1.70 71.1% Blaine Republican Republican 70.4
1871 42 1 1 1.95 57.8% Blaine Republican Republican 56.0
1873 43 1 1 1.74 70.3% Blaine Republican Republican 68.2
1875 44 1 1 1.89 62.0% Kerr Democrat Democrat 62.1
1877 45 1 1 1.99 53.0% Randall Democrat Democrat 52.9
1879 46 1 1 2.19 50.7% Randall Democrat Democrat 48.1
1881 47 1 1 2.10 51.9% Keifer Republican Republican 51.5
1883 48 1 1 1.94 61.7% Carlisle Democrat Democrat 60.3
1885 49 1 1 1.97 56.3% Carlisle Democrat Democrat 56.0
1887 50 1 1 2.02 53.1% Carlisle Democrat Democrat 51.4
1889 51 1 1 2.01 51.7% Reed Republican Republican 53.9
1891 52 1 1 1.73 71.5% Crisp Democrat Democrat 71.7
1893 53 1 1 1.94 62.5% Crisp Democrat Democrat 61.2
1895 54 1 1 1.76 70.1% Reed Republican Republican 71.2
1897 55 1 1 2.11 59.5% Reed Republican Republican 57.7
1899 56 1 1 2.06 52.8% Henderson Republican Republican 52.4
1901 57 1 1 2.00 55.5% Henderson Republican Republican 56.0
Table 2.  Preliminary periodization of House speakership battles.
Period Congresses Years Summary
1 1st–11th 1789–1811 Weak party identification and organizational strength. Speakership not highly valued.
2 12th–26th 1811–41
Party factionalization.  Speakership a valued prize. 
Strong individuals (Clay and Stevenson) dominated in
the face of underlying factionalism.
3 27th–36th 1841–61
Strong party identification.  Weak party discipline.
Speakership a valued prize. Regional tensions impeded
swift resolution to Speakership battles
4 37th–?? 1861–??
Strong party identification.  Strong party discipline at
organization.  Speakership a valued prize.  Inter-party
disagreements ironed out before formal balloting.
Table 3.  Roll call winning percentage as a function of first and second dimension Heckman-Snyder scores.
h1 h2
Cong. h1 h12 h2 h22 const. N
Floor
median
Coalition
median
Test
resulta
Floor
median
Coalition
median
Test
resulta
26 -0.12
(0.01)
-0.18
(0.02)
-0.09
(0.01)
0.03
(0.06)
0.73
(0.01)
254 .96 -0.18 0.72 % -0.02 -0.05 £
27 0.11
(0.01)
-0.05
(0.01)
-0.12
(0.01)
-0.07
(0.03)
0.65
(0.01)
255 .92 -0.23 0.71 £ 0.03 0.11 %
28 0.01
(0.01)
-0.15
(0.01)
0.12
(0.01)
-0.13
(0.03)
0.72
(0.01)
230 .87 -0.29 -0.45 0 0.02 0.05 £
29 -0.03
(0.01)
-0.09
(0.01)
0.12
(0.01)
-0.06
(0.03)
0.69
(0.01)
233 .89 -0.30 -0.48 £ 0.00 0.19 £
30 0.08
(0.01)
-0.13
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.01)
-0.16
(0.02)
0.72
(0.01)
233 .91 0.18 0.73 £ 0.08 0.16 0
31 0.14
(0.004)
-0.17
(0.02)
-0.04
(0.01)
-0.14
(0.04)
0.68
(0.01)
239 .77 -0.04 -0.63 % -0.00 -0.02 £
32 0.10
(0.01)
-0.08
(0.02)
-0.08
(0.01)
-0.04
(0.02)
0.64
(0.01)
238 .64 -0.02 -0.32 % 0.04 0.01 £
33 -0.14
(0.01)
-0.05
(0.02)
-0.17
(0.01)
-0.08
(0.02)
0.66
(0.01)
237 .89 -0.10 -0.41 £ 0.00 0.04 %
34 0.17
(0.003)
-0.07
(0.01)
-0.11
(0.01)
-0.11
(0.02)
0.64
(0.01)
235 .96 -0.09 0.77 £ 0.03 0.05 %
35 0.10
(0.01)
-0.09
(0.01)
0.14
(0.01)
-0.07
(0.02)
0.64
(0.01)
242 .81 -0.27 -0.69 % -0.05 0.03 £
36 0.29
(0.01)
-0.06
(0.01)
-0.17
(0.01)
0.10
(0.03)
0.69
(0.004)
243 .99 0.19 0.60 £ -0.01 0.00 %
a £ = null hypothesis that the floor median is the most frequent winner is rejected; coefficient correctly signed
% = null hypothesis that the floor median is the most frequent winner is rejected; coefficient incorrectly signed
0 = null hypothesis that the floor median is the most frequent winner is not rejected
Table 4.  Effect of voting for winning speakership candidate on ideological position of returning House members.
No controls for party Controls for party Overall
Voted for winning
Speaker candidate
Voted for winning
Speaker candidate
Average value of
first dimension score
Cong.
This
Cong.
( 2)
Last
Cong.
( 1) R2
This
Cong.
( 2)
Last
Cong.
( 1) R2 N
Voted
for
winner
Didn’t
vote for
winner
p value
of t-test
27 0.11
(0.05)
-0.12
(0.06)
.96 0.16
(0.05)
-0.10
(0.08)
.96 103 0.40 -0.43 .00
28 -0.27
(0.27)
-0.04
(0.08)
.98 — 0.18
(0.14)
.81 38 -0.28 0.53 .00
29 -0.06
(0.06)
-0.22
(0.12)
.98 -0.10
(0.07)
— .98 87 -0.37 0.55 .00
30 0.26
(0.10)
-0.03
(0.05)
.98 0.43
(0.12)
-0.02
(0.05)
.98 86 0.56 -0.55 .00
31 -0.03
(0.04)
-0.09
(0.06)
.97 -0.03
(0.05)
-0.09
(0.10)
.96 84 -0.46 +0.38 .00
32 -0.07
(0.08)
0.09
(0.08)
.92 0.01
(0.08)
0.10
(0.08)
.92 84 -0.27 0.31 .00
33 -0.10
(0.17)
-0.05
(0.08)
.80 -0.20
(0.22)
-0.03
(0.14)
.51 73 -0.22 0.40 .00
34 1.00
(0.09)
-0.09
(0.05)
.99 0.94
(0.07)
-0.09
(0.04)
.98 71 0.62 -0.55 .00
35 -0.10
(0.11)
-0.31
(0.20)
.96 -0.92
(0.08)
-0.35
(0.20)
.96 105 -0.36 0.46 .00
36 0.42
(0.08)
-0.03
(0.05)
.98 0.42
(0.07)
-0.03
(0.06)
.96 103 0.45 -0.46 .00
